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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0 0 0 O 0 0 0 
AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corpora t ion , 
Plaintiff /Appellant , 
- v s - Case No. 14444 
• 
MILLER, ADAMS and CRAWFORD 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, dba MAC : 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a c o r p o r a -
t ion, LONNY ADAMS, GLENDA ADAMS, 
GERALD CRAWFORD, DIANE 
CRAWFORD and LENORA PHILLIPS, : 
Defendants /Respondents . : 
„ . - „ - - • - , OOOOOOO 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This i s an action by the Appellant Amer ican States Insurance 
Company against the Respondents for damages which the Appellant suffered 
when the Respondents b reached an Agreement of Indemnity. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
No respons ive pleadings w e r e filed by any of the defendants 
to Appel lant ' s Complaint and on October 17, 1974, a Judgment by Default 
was en te red in the Dis t r i c t Court of Washington County, Utah. On Apr i l 24 , 
1975, defendant Lenora Phi l l ips moved to compel sat isfact ion of Judgment . 
On Apr i l 30, 1975 defendants Gera ld Crawford and Diane Crawford a l s o 
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moved to compel satisfaction of Judgment. On January 22, 1976, the 
Honorable J . Harlan Burns granted the Motions to Compel Satisfaction 
of Judgment as to all defendants in this case. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks to have the Order of the District Court 
granting defendants' Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment vacated. • 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 14, 1973, the defendant MAC Construction Company 
submitted an application for contract bond to the plaintiff American States 
Insurance Company in connection with the construction of an addition to 
the LDS Temple located in St. George, Utah. (ft. 3-6) In conjunction 
with the application for contract bond, on May 14, 1973, defendants MAC 
Construction Company, Lonny Adams, Glenda Adams, Gerald Crawford, 
Diane Crawford and Lenora Phillips executed an Agreement of Indemnity 
in favor of plaintiff American States Insurance Company, agreeing to 
indemnify American States for the amounts, if any, which American States 
might have to pay under the bond. (R. 29, 30) Plaintiff American States 
subsequently issued the contract bond to MAC Construction Company. 
(R. 7) '• 
The defendant MAC Construction Company failed to pay all 
of the labor and mater ia l claimants in connection with the construction 
project referred to above. Pursuant to the terms of the bond, the plaintiff 
American States paid to the claimants the sum of $13,363.65. (R. 1-2) 
-2~ ' .- :" 
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On March 7, 1974, prior to the time the labor and material 
claimants were paid by plaintiff American States, a meeting was held 
between representatives of defendant MAC Construction Company and 
plaintiff American States concerning this claim. As a result of that 
meeting, MAC Construction Company assigned to American States a 
part ial interest in two mechanics liens which it had filed on the Sun Stone 
Condominium Project located in St. George, Utah, as an inducement to 
plaintiff American States to pay the labor and material claimants under 
the terms of the bond, inasmuch as the claimants were pressing the 
defendant MAC Construction Company for payment. (R. 65-67) 
No payments were received by plaintiff American States on 
the assignment of liens or from any of the defendants under the Agreement 
of Indemnity. On April 15, 1974, plaintiff American States filed a Complaint 
in the District Court of Washington County, Utah. (R. 1-11) The defendants 
Lonny Adams, Glenda Adams and Lenora Phillips were personally served 
on April 19, 1974; the defendant MAC Construction Company was served 
on May 21, 1974 by serving its process agent Frank A. Allen; and the 
defendants Gerald Crawford and Diane Crawford were personally served 
on May 13, 1974. (R. 13-17, 20) No responsive pleadings were filed by 
any of the defendants ard their defaults were therefore entered with a 
Judgment by Default being entered on October 17, 1974, after a hearing 
concerning the claim for.attorney's fees . (R. 18, 21, 28-30) The 
Agreement of Indemnity was reduced to Judgment at this time. (R. 29,30) 
• : - 3 - ' ...... 
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On November 11, 1974, a Supplemental Order was issued 
against all of the defendants and delivered to the Sheriff of Washington . 
County for service. The same was returned unserved with the notation 
that the defendants Lonny Adams, Glenda Adams, Gerald Crawford, 
Diane Crawford and Lenora Phillips had moved from the State of Utah 
and that no officer of the defendant MAC Construction Company could be 
found. (R. 32, 62) 
On November 25, 1974, plaintiff American States was contacted 
by representatives of Cedar Valley Development Corporation, who had 
taken over the Sun Stone Condominium Project, and who asserted that 
the liens filed by the defendant MAC Construction Company were "invalid 
and/or grossly exaggerated. n On December 4, 1974, plaintiff American 
States agreed to accept the sum of $6, 666. 00 from Cedar Valley Develop-
ment Corporation in exchange for a release of the Assignment of Liens. 
(R. 68) American States accepted the offer of Cedar Valley Development 
Corporation because the validity of the Assignment of Liens had been 
challenged and none of the defendants could be located to confirm or deny 
this allegation, nor to assist the plaintiff in any legal action to enforce 
the l iens. 
It was not until garnishment and execution proceedings were 
initiated against the property of the defendants that they showed any interest 
in the litigation. (R. 33-42) Thereafter, on April 24, 1975, defendant 
Lenora Phillips filed a Motion to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment. (R. 43, 
- 4 . ••'.' 
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44) On April 30, 1975 defendants Gerald Crawford and Diane Crawford 
also filed a Motion to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment. (R. 45-47) 
On May 20, 1975, defendant Lenora Phillips filed a Motion to Vacate 
Judgment. On December 30, 1975, the Honorable J . Harlan Burns issued 
Orders granting the defendants1 Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment 
and denying defendant Lenora Phillip's Motion to Vacate Judgment. (R. 130-
133) An Amended Order dated January 22, 1976, extended the Order 
granting the Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment to all defendants. 
(R. 136-137) It is from that Order that plaintiff has prosecuted this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MOTIONS TO COMPEL SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT RAISED . 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES WHICH WERE IMPROPERLY AND UNTIMELY 
FILED. 
Each defendant in this case was personally and properly 
served with Summons and notice of plaintiffs Complaint. Despite such 
notice, none of the defendants filed responsive pleadings, nor did any of 
them appear in Court to answer the allegations in plaintiff!s Complaint. 
Thus, the Default Judgment entered in plaintiff's favor and against defendants 
was proper and in accordance with the laws of this State. If any of the 
defendants had good reason for their failure to answer or appear in defense 
of this matter , Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
a means by which they could attempt to set aside the Default Judgment. 
- 5 -
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The rule states that a Motion to set aside a Judgment must 
be made within a reasonable time and if the Motion is based upon such 
reasons as excusable neglect, then it must be made within three (3) months 
after the Judgment is entered. Again, the defendants failed to take any-
such action under Rule 60(b) within a reasonable time. As noted above in 
the Statement of Facts , defendant Lenora Phillips did make a Motion to 
Vacate more than six months after the Judgment was entered and the trial 
court properly denied the defendants Motion. Peck v. Cook, 29 Utah 2d 
375, 510 P.2d 530 (1973). 
Also, approximately nine (9) months after their Default 
had been entered and six (6) months after the Default Judgment, the defen-
dants made Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment. One of the basis 
of the defendants1 Motions was that the previous Assignment of Liens 
operated as a nsatisfaction in full" of the claims of the plaintiff against all 
of the defendants. The Assignment of Liens was executed on March 7, 
1974, and plaintiff1 s Complaint was not filed until April 15, 1974. Having 
failed to answer plaintiff's Complaint, the defendants then attempted to 
ra ise affirmative defenses in the guise of a Motion to Compel Satisfaction 
of Judgment. In this regard, Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides in part as follows: 
n(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a 
preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, . . . 
l a c h e s , . . .payment, re lease , . . . waiver, 
and any other matter constituting an 
- 6 -
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avoidance or affirmative de fense . . . . 
n(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments 
in a pleading to which a responsive pleading 
is required, other than those as to the amount 
of damage, are admitted when not denied in 
the responsive pleading. — fl 
It is clear that the defendants, through the use of their Motions 
to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment, are attempting to evade the clear 
language of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court interpreting these rules, and the doctrine of res judicata. 
It should be noted that the defendants, in their one lone attempt, failed to 
succeed in vacating plaintiff1 s Judgment. In denying defendants1 Motion to 
Vacate, the trial court ruled in conformance with the opinions of this 
Court. In Airkem Intermountain* Inc. v. Parker , 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P . 2d 
429 (1973), the defendant did file an Answer to plaintifffs Complaint and 
participated otherwise in the proceedings prior to trial , but due to some 
confusion at the time of trial in the withdrawal of defendant's counsel, the 
defendant was not represented at the trial and neither did he appear person-
ally. The Court entered a Default Judgment in plaintiff's favor and the 
defendant subsequently moved to vacate the Judgment on the ground of 
excusable neglect. The trial court denied the defendant's Motion and the 
Supreme Court affirmed, stating: 
f !
— The trial court must balance two valid 
considerations; on the one hand, to relieve 
the party of the judgment vitiates the effect 
of res judicata and creates a hardship for 
the successful litigant by causing him to 
" 7 - " ' , • ' " • . . • ' . " : 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prosecute more than once his action and 
subjecting him to the possible loss of 
collecting his judgment. On the other hand, 
the court desires to protect the losing party 
who has not had the opportunity to present 
his claim or defense. The rule that the courts 
will incline towards granting relief to a party, 
who has not had the opportunity to present his 
case, is ordinarily applied at the tr ial court 
level, and this court will not reverse the 
determination of the trial court merely because 
the motion could have been granted. For this 
court to overturn the discretion of the lower 
court in refusing to vacate a valid judgment, 
the requirements of public policy demand more 
than a mere statement that a person did not 
have his day in court when full opportunity for 
a fair hearing was afforded to him or his legal 
representative. The movant must show that 
he has used due diligence and that he was 
prevented from appearing by circumstances over 
which he had no control ." [Emphasis is original] 
It seems clear that the defendant in Airkem made at least an effort to pa r t i -
cipate in the case, whereas in the instant case the defendants ignored the 
proceedings entirely until some six (6) months after Judgment. Thus, 
when the defendants found that, for good reason, they could not set aside 
the Judgment, they attempted an "end run11.with the Motions to Compel 
Satisfaction of Judgment. 
The general rule concerning an attempt by the defendant to 
answer after the entry of a Default Judgment is stated in 61 Am. Jur .2d , 
' • • • ' • ' • . 
Pleading, Section 354: 
"Upon the failure of the defendant to answer 
the declaration or complaint within the time 
allowed by law, and upon the entry of default, 
in the absence of fraud, the right of the 
- 8 -
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defendant to participate in the litigation is 
terminated, and the subsequent filing of an 
answer or demurrer on his part is unauthor-
ized and void unless upon due and regular 
proceedings the default is first set a s i d e , . . . I f 
The Utah Supreme Court has followed the general rules outlined 
above in numerous cases. In F .M.A . Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc . , 
17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P. 2d 670 (1965), the plaintiff sued defendant on a note 
and to foreclose a mortgage which the defendant had given to plaintiff's 
assignor. The defendant pled the defense of lack of consideration but the 
t r ial court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The defendant 
made la ter attempts to interpose other defenses but without success and the 
defendant appealed. In affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court 
commented on the defendant's actions: 
"Defendant made belated attempts to inter-
pose other defenses: accord and satisfaction; 
account stated; and laches, none of which had 
been asserted in its answer. We think the 
tr ial court was justified in regarding them as 
without meri t . Under Rule 8(c) U. R, C. P . 
these are classified as affirmative defenses 
which are required to be stated in the answer* 
The failure to plead such an affirmative 
defense generally results in its exclusion as 
an issue in the c a s e . . . . " [Emphasis added] 
In Hammond v. Calder, 8 Utah 2d 333, 334 P. 2d 562 (1959), 
plaintiff obtained a Judgment against the defendant through stipulation by 
the par t ies . Approximately a year and a half later , the defendant attempted 
what appears to have been a collateral attack on the Judgment by filing a 
pleading entitled nDefendant!s Request for Claim Against Plaintiff1. The 
- 9 -
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t r ia l court denied this Motion and the Supreme Court affirmed, stating: 
"Treating the assigned e r r o r s in reverse , 
in January, 1958, long after the trial and 
entry of judgment defendant filed what 
appears to have been an abortive pleading 
called 'Defendant's Request for Claim Against 
Plaintiff1, claiming to own the granary 
Eskridge built and removed from the property. 
We think the court properly refused to entertain 
the m a t t e r . . . . , ! [Emphasis added] 
I n T o d a r o v . Gardner, 3 Utah 2d 404, 285 P . 2d 839 (1955), the 
Utah Supreme Court made a clear statement of its application of the general 
rule . The Court did not apply the rule in Todaro, because of the particular 
facts in a complicated conflicts and choice of actions case, but made the 
following statement of the rule: 
"In support of the argument that the tr ial 
court should not have allowed respondent 
to produce evidence as to his affirmative 
defense, appellants present us with an ar ray 
of legal authority to the effect that a party 
is concluded in a subsequent matter not only 
as to mat ters actually determined in the 
prior action, but also as to other issues 
which could properly have been determined. 
These authorities present the policy of 
the law to foreclose piecemeal litigation 
and hold, generally, that a judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff is an adjudication, not merely 
as to the existence of the plaintiff's cause of 
action, but, as to the nonexistence of any 
defenses thereto. We accept this reasoning 
but cannot force an application of the doctrine 
to the present case. — " 
The defendants1 Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment in 
this case are based in part on the grounds that the Assignment of Liens 
-10-
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operated as satisfaction or payment in full of plaintiffs claim. This is 
clearly an affirmative defense which must be pled in a responsive pleading 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the decisions of this Court. 
As noted in 60 Am. Jur . 2d, Payment, Section 115: 
fIAt common law, evidence of payment was 
admissible under a general denial. However, 
payment is an affirmative defense under 
modern codes such as the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and must be pleaded by the 
one resist ing the claim .fT 
The defendants failed to plead their affirmative defense in 
any responsive pleading and cannot now be allowed to ra ise their defense 
in an improper and untimely filed Motion to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment. 
The defendants' attempt to invalidate the Default Judgment in 
favor of plaintiff also runs afoul of the doctrine of r e s judicata. The general 
rule applicable to this case is stated in 46 Am. Jur .2d , Judgments, Section 
404:. " 
f!A final judgment on the mer i t s , rendered by 
a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive 
as to the rights of the parties and their privies, 
and as to them constitutes an absolute bar to 
a subsequent action involving the same claim, 
demand, and cause of action, whether the plaintiff 
fails to recover in the first action, or is success-
ful in recovering a part of its claim. The 
judgment puts an end to the cause of action, which 
cause cannot again be brought into litigation 
between the parties upon any ground, or for any 
purpose whatever, in the absence of some factor 
invalidating the judgment. !l 
The rule is further elaborated in Section 417: 
- 1 1 -
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"The phase of the doctrine of r e s judicata 
precluding subsequent litigation of the same 
cause of action is much broader in its appli-
cation than a determination of the questions 
involved in the prior action; the conclusiveness 
of the judgment in such case extends not only 
to mat ters actually determined, but also to 
other mat ters which could properly have been 
raised and determined therein. This rule 
applies to every question relevant to and 
falling within the purvue of the original action, 
in respect to mat ters of both claim or grounds 
of recovery, and defense, which could have 
been presented by the exercise of due diligence. ,T 
Annotation, Doctrine of Res Judicata as Applied to Default 
Judgments, 77 A . L . R . 2d 1410, Section 2, considers the question as follows: 
! ,The default judgment, like any final and valid 
judgment rendered on the mer i ts after contest, 
precludes the plaintiff from thereafter maintaining 
an action against the defendant or his privy on 
the same cause of action. On the other hand, the 
plaintiff may maintain an action of the judgment, 
and the defendant cannot, in this action or any 
other proceeding, relitigate the question of the 
validity of the cause of action upon which the 
judgment was rendered, or otherwise contest 
the existence and amount of the judgment debt. " 
[Emphasis added] 
The Utah Supreme Court agrees with the principles noted above, 
as expressed, for example, in the case of Matthews v. Matthews, 102 Utah 
428, 132 P.2d 111 (1942). In affirming the tr ial court fs action in dismissing 
the plaintiff1 s Complaint on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata, the 
Court stated as follows: 
nThe foundation principle upon which the 
doctrine of res judicata res t s is that parties 
ought not to be permitted to litigate the same 
-12-
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issue more than once; that, when a right or 
fact has been judicially tried and determined 
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an 
opportunity for such trial has been given, the 
judgment of the court, so long as it remains 
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the 
par t ies , and those in privity with them in law 
or estate. . . . Public policy and the interest 
of litigants alike require that there be an end 
to litigation, and the peace and order of society 
demand that mat ters distinctly put in issue 
and determined by a court of competent ju r i s -
diction as to parties and subject matter shall 
not be retr ied between the same parties in any 
subsequent suit in any court. M [Emphasis 
added] 
The instant case is not one where service of Summons was had 
by publication or some other indirect means. Each of these defendants 
was served personally and thus had full notice of the plaintiff!s Complaint 
and their obligation to answer that Complaint. The defendants chose not to 
avail themselves of their right to answer or of their opportunity to be heard. 
Yet they cannot deny that such an opportunity was given to them, nor can 
they deny that they failed to take advantage of such opportunity. Therefore, 
the doctrine of res judicata precludes any hearing at this late date on their 
allegations of satisfaction of plaintiff's Complaint, for the issue is settled 
and conclusive upon the parties by the Default Judgment. 
' POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS 
OF THE DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts above, the plaintiff disposed 
-13-
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of the collateral assigned to it by defendants without notice to defendants, 
due to the fact that plaintiff1 s interest in the collateral had been challenged 
and the defendants were unavailable to refute or explain this challenge. In 
view of the foregoing, any attempted notice to the defendants would have 
been futile. Additionally, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Agreement of Indemnity which had been reduced to Judgment, specifically 
provided that no notice needed to be given. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provide that 
the plaintiff is exempt from any requirement to give notice to defendants 
who were in default. Rule 55(a)(2) reads as follows: 
"Notice to Party in Default. After the entry 
of the default of any party, as provided in 
subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be 
necessary to give such party in default any 
notice of action taken or to be taken or to serve 
any notice or paper otherwise required by 
these rules to be served on a party to the action 
or proceeding, except as provided in Rule 5(a).11 
The provisions of this rule are clearly applicable to the instant case, and 
by failing to answer, the defendants lost whatever right of notice they may 
have had. 
In addition, the defendants expressly waived any right of notice 
by written agreement. The Agreement of Indemnity signed by all of the 
defendants, provides in part as follows: 
"SIXTEENTH: That the Contractor and the 
Indemnitors shall continue to remain bound 
under the terms of this Agreement even though 
the Surety may have from time to time hereto-
-14-
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fore or hereafter, with or without notice to or 
knowledge of the Contractor and the Indemnitors, 
accepted or released other agreements of 
indemnity or collateral in connection with the 
execution or procurement of said Bonds, from 
the Contractor or Indemnitors or others, it 
being expressly understood and agreed by the 
Contractor and the Indemnitors that any and all 
other rights which the Surety may have or 
acquire against the Contractor and the Indemnitors 
and/or others under any such other or additional 
agreements of indemnity or collateral shall be 
in addition to, and not in lieu of, the rights 
afforded the Surety under this Agreement.n 
[Emphasis added] 
Defendants alleged in their Motions to Compel Satisfaction of 
Judgment that the provision in the Agreement of Indemnity cited above is 
invalid, since Section 70A-9~501(3)(b), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended), provides that the notice requirement contained in Section 70A-9-
504(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), cannot be waived. The 
plaintiff does not necessarily agree with the defendants* contention, but 
even if true, the claimed invalidity of the waiver of notice provision is an 
affirmative defense. If the provision is invalid, it was also invalid at the 
time the plaintiff filed its Complaint, and this should have been pled as an 
affirmative defense in answer to plaintiffs Complaint. 
The applicable rule is stated in 47 Am. Jur . 2d, Judgments, 
Section 919, as follows: 
l!It is a general rule of law that in an action 
on a judgment, the original cause of action 
is not examinable on the mer i t s , and that no 
matter of defense may be asserted which ~ 
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existed anterior to the judgment and which 
might have been set up in the original 
proceedings. n [Emphasis added] 
It is clear that any claim of the invalidity of the provision in 
the Agreement of Indemnity existed from the time the agreement was signed 
and, therefore, also existed anterior to the Judgment and should have been 
set up in a responsive pleading. This fundamental principle has been incorp-
orated into the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provide as follows: 
11
 (c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a 
preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively accord and sa t i s fac t ion , . . . 
laches, payment, re lease , waiver, 
and any other mat ter constituting an 
avoidance or affirmative d e f e n s e . . . . 
"(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments 
in a pleading to which a responsive pleading 
is required, other than those as to the amount 
of damage, a re admitted when not denied in 
the responsive pleading n 
The Utah Supreme Court consistently has followed the rule 
cited above. In Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs , 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P. 2d 507 
(1956), the Court dealt with a rather complicated inheritance case but 
repeated the general rule as follows: 
M
. . . It is also true that generally a failure 
to plead an affirmative defense resul ts in 
its waiver and excludes it as an issue in 
the c a s e . . . . ! l 
See also the language of the Utah Supreme Court opinions cited in Point I. 
Additionally, the Agreement of Indemnity signed by the 
defendants which was incorporated into the plaintiff's Complaint was reduced 
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to Judgment and by not contesting the same, its provisions became 
binding on the par t ies . In this regard, 47 Am.Jur .2d , Judgments, 
Section 1207, provides as follows: 
"There is considerable authority supporting 
the rule that a default judgment for the plaintiff 
in an action to recover on a contract, promis-
sory note, or other instrument, is res judicata 
with respect to the existence and validity of 
the contract or i n s t rumen t . . . . M 
The substance of the adversary system under which we function 
is that a party must plead and prove any claims or defenses which he has 
available to him. The defense asserted here is not nself executing" and 
r i ses to no greater height than any other defense such as lack of consideration, 
usury, contributory negligence, e t c , , all of which are lost if not timely 
asser ted. 
The Order of the tr ial court holding that the waiver of notice 
provision of the Agreement of Indemnity was invalid is clearly contrary to 
the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the cases cited herein* 
It should be noted that despite the lack of any obligation on the 
part of plaintiff to give notice of the disposition of the collateral to defendants, 
the plaintiff was prevented from giving such notice by the defendants' own 
actions. As previously set forth in the Statement of Facts above, a 
Supplemental Order was issued on November 11, 1974, against all of the 
defendants and delivered to the Sheriff of Washington County for service. 
The Sheriff returned the Order unserved with the notation that the 
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defendants had moved from the State of Utah and that no officer of the 
defendant MAC Construction Company could be found. In other words, 
the defendants nmade themselves scarce" but now raise the contradictory-
argument that the plaintiff had a duty to search them out in order to serve 
notice upon them. Even if the plaintiff had such a duty, the defendants by 
their own actions made it impossible for the plaintiff to perform such a 
duty. Fur ther , the plaintiff was satisfied and is satisfied that the amount 
plaintiff received for the release of the Assignment of Liens was the greatest 
amount it could have received from any party. 
POINT i n 
IN ANY EVENT, PLAINTIFF HAS THE RIGHT TO A HEARING TO PROVE 
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE COLLATERAL. 
The defendants claim that despite the plaintiff1 s Default Judgment, 
they stil l retain the right of notice of the disposition of the collateral under 
Section 70A~9-504(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). Plaintiff 
disputes this contention as set forth in Points I and II, but conceding 
defendants1 position for the sake of argument, plaintiff contends that it has 
the right to prove that the value it received for the disposition of the collateral 
was the fair market value and that the defendants a re entitled to credit on 
the Judgment in this amount. It does not appear that this Court has ruled 
on the question, but decisions from other jurisdictions support the plaintiff!s 
position. 
In United States v. Whitehouse Plast ics , 501 F.2d 692 (C. A- 5 j 
-18-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tex.) , cert . den. 43 L.Ed. 2d 777, 95 S. Ct. 1566, the creditor sold the 
collateral without notice to the debtor under Section 9-504(3) of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. The Court ruled that the better view is that 
the c r ed i t o r s failure to give notice creates , at most, a rebuttable p re -
sumption that the value of the collateral equals the amount of the debt, 
placing on the secured party the burden of proving that the fair market 
value of the goods sold was less than this amount. The same result was 
reached in Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash.App. 866, 496 P . 2d 
966 (1972). In this case, the Court reversed the tr ial court 's Judgment which 
had denied a deficiency to the creditor on the basis that the creditor had 
failed to give proper notice to the debtor. The Court held that the creditor 's 
failure to give notice does not result in a forfeiture of the creditor 's right 
to a deficiency judgment. 
In Community Management Assoc, v. Tousley, 505 P . 2d 1314 
(Colo. App. 1973), the creditor repossessed the debtor's automobiles and 
resold them without notice to the debtor. The appellate court reversed the 
t r ial court 's decision that the creditor was barred from a deficiency 
judgment, ruling that the creditor or secured party retained the right to a 
deficiency judgment, but the failure to give notice places upon the secured 
party the burden of proving the market value of the collateral by evidence 
other than the amount received on the sale. 
These cases il lustrate the better view, particularly where the 
creditor or secured party had good reason to believe it was not required 
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to give notice as in the instant case, that the mere failure to give notice 
should not operate as a bar to a deficiency judgment- Plaintiff contends 
that, in any event, it has the right to a hearing where it may offer evidence 
to prove that the amount received in the disposition of the collateral was 
the fair market value and that the defendants remain bound for the balance 
due on the Default Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The basis of the Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment 
a re (1) that the Assignment of Liens operated as a payment in full of the 
obligation, and (2) that the waiver of notice provision of the Agreement of 
Indemnity signed by the part ies is invalid. Both of these are affirmative 
defenses which the defendants were required to plead and prove in 
accordance with the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
by their failure to timely asser t the same, they were lost. By granting 
the defendants1 Motions to Compel Satisfaction of Judgment the tr ial court 
has allowed the defendants to asser t affirmative defenses some six (6) 
months after the Default Judgment had been entered and without the same 
ever having been set aside. 
It should also be noted that notwithstanding the fact that all 
the defendants were personally served with the process , they showed a 
complete disregard for the same until garnishment and execution proceedings 
were initiated against them. 
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff urges this Court to 
:
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vacate the Order granting the defendants' Motion to Compel Satisfaction 
of Judgment. 
Dated this 12 th day of April, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J . Anthony Eyre 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
to J . MacArthur Wright, Attorney for Defendant/Respondent Phillips, 
75 North 100 East, St. George, Utah 84770; and to Frank A. Allen, 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents Crawford, 747 East 100 North, 
St. George, Utah 84770, this 12th day of April, 1976. 
Secretary 
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